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RULE 24(a)(1) LIST OF PARTIES

Case No. C85-5168
Plaintiff
CAHOON & MAXFIELD IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah corporation
Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs
WATERSIDE ASSOCIATES, a limited partnership; MACHAN-HAMPSHIRE
PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah corporation; and W.E.S./MHP VENTURE
Third-Party Defendants
D. STODDARD JUDD and VALENE A. JUDD, husband and wife

Case No. C87-6497
Plaintiffs
D. STODDARD JUDD and VALENE A. JUDD, husband and wife
Defendants
BRUCE McMULLIN; WESTERN ENVIRO-SYSTEMS, INC., a Utah corporation;
WATERSIDE ASSOCIATES, a limited partnership; MACHAN-HAMPSHIRE
PROPERTIES, INC., general partner; MACHAN-HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES,
INC., a Utah corporation; and W.E.S./MHP VENTURE, as a partnership
or unincorporated joint venture
The cases have been consolidated.
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JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)(j) (Cum. Supp. 1991).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1.

Did the trial court properly find that D. Stoddard

Judd and Valene A. Judd (the "Judds") breached their duty to defend
and warrant title?
case in equity.

The Supreme Court may review the evidence in a

However, "due to the advantaged position of the

trial court, [the Supreme Court] indulge[s] considerable deference
to his findings and do[es] not interfere with them unless the
evidence so clearly preponderates against them that [the Supreme
Court] is convinced that a manifest injustice has been done."
Hatch v^ Bastian. 567 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977).

2.

Did the trial court properly find that appellees

(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Waterside") did not waive
the Judds1 duty to defend?

The standard of review is the same as

that for issue #1 above.

1

STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

Utah Code Ann, Section 57-1-12 (1990) (emphasis added).
Form of warranty deed — Effect.
Conveyance of land may be substantially in the following form:
WARRANTY DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of residence), hereby
conveys and warrants to
(insert
name), grantee, of
(insert place of
residence), for the sum of
dollars, the
following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the
premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
day of
, 19
.
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and
assigns, of the premises therein named, together with all the
appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto belonging, with
covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives,
that he is lawfully seised of the premises that he has good right
to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and
assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free
from all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and personal
representatives will forever warrant and defend the title thereof
in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims
whatsoever.
Any exceptions to such covenants may be briefly
inserted in such deed following the description of the land.

STATEMENT OF CASE

a)

Nature of the Case.

This case involves disputes

between Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Company ("Cahoon"), Waterside
and the Judds over title to a parcel of property (the "Property")
conveyed by the Judds by warranty deed and eventually acquired by
2

Waterside. Waterside claimed that the Judds breached their duty to
defend and warrant title.

b)

Course of Proceedings.

A bench trial was conducted

before Judge Timothy R. Hanson on November 14, 1989.

Cahoon was

not present, its claims having been settled prior to trial.

All

other parties were represented by counsel at trial.

The matter proceeded by proffer of testimony by all
parties through their respective
marked and received

attorneys, and

into evidence.

exhibits were

After having received the

pleadings on file, the evidence and exhibits of the parties, and
the pre- and post-trial briefs submitted by the parties to the
court, and having considered the arguments of counsel, the trial
court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment
in favor of Waterside.

c)

Disposition at Trial Court.

The trial court found

that the Judds breached their duty to defend and warrant title
entitling Waterside to be indemnified for the costs they incurred
in defending title and settling the fee title claims of Cahoon.
The Judds have appealed the trial court's decision.

3

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Western Enviro-Systems, Inc. ("Western Enviro11) purchased
the Property from the Judds by Warranty Deed on August 17, 1983.
Third-Party Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 9.

The Warranty Deed given to

Western Enviro by the Judds contained the customary requirement to
"defend and warrant" title to the buyer.

The Warranty Deed

contained the exceptions as stated below:

SUBJECT TO Easements, Restrictions and Rights of Way,
currently of record and/or enforceable in law and equity,
and general property taxes for the year 1983 and
thereafter, in any and all water rights of record.

Third-Party Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9.

(TR:00870, page 15, lines 11-

16) .

By Quit Claim Deeds, Western Enviro and R. Bruce McMullin
conveyed

their interest

in the Property to W.E.S./MHP Joint

Venture. Third-Party Plaintiffs1 Exhibits 11 and 12. On June 28,
1985,

W.E.S./MHP

Joint

Venture

transferred

Waterside Associates by Warranty Deed.

the

property

to

Third-Party Plaintiffs'

Exhibit 15.

On September 27, 1985, Cahoon filed suit against thirdparty plaintiffs, Waterside, claiming, among other things, a fee
simple interest to a ditch area that cut through Waterside's
development.

Third-Party Plaintiffs' Exhibits 29 and 30.
4

When

sued by Cahoon, Waterside made demand upon the Judds to defend the
title and filed and served their third-party complaint. (TR:00870,
pages 8-9, 16-17)

Third-Party Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 34.

Rather than defend title, the Judds began a non-judicial
foreclosure proceeding against Waterside in September of 1986.
(TR:00870, pages 8, 16-17) Following a hearing on August 6, 1987,
the court entered a preliminary

injunction against the Judds

enjoining them from proceeding with their foreclosure action.
(TR:00870, pages 8-9)

That order is not part of this appeal.

After consideration of Cahoon's claims and the potential
effects of an adverse ruling on the entire project, Waterside
determined that the risk of an adverse finding warranted some
attempt at settlement and compromise with Cahoon. (TR:00870, pages
7-10)

Prior to trial, Waterside and Cahoon reached a stipulated
resolution of their claims. (TR:00870, page 7, lines 11-16)

The

Judds refused offers to participate in the negotiations that led to
the settlement between Waterside and Cahoon. (TR:00870, pages 1011)

The Judds1 defense of title consisted of retaining various

attorneys

(TR:00870, pages 16-18), doing some minimal research

(TR:00870, page 20, lines 16-18) and appearing at trial claiming
that they were then ready to defend title.

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The trial court properly found that the Judds breached
their duty to defend and warrant title. The evidence proffered at
trial showed that (1) the Judds did not accept the defense of
title, or relieve Waterside of the necessity of defending against
the claims of Cahoon; (2) the Judds did not provide any real or
effective assistance with regard to defending against Cahoon's
title claim; and (3) the only action taken by the Judds was to hire
counsel, obtain an attorneys opinion and research Cahoon1s records.
Actual eviction is not necessary for a claim of breach of warranty
of title. The trial court properly applied Utah case law in ruling
that the Judds breached their duty to warrant title.

Waterside did not waive the Judds1 duty to defend.

The

evidence proffered at trial was conclusive that the Judds refused
to participate in the defense of title despite requests from
Waterside to do so.

ARGUMENT

The Judds1 arguments on appeal can be separated into two
general contentions: (1) The evidence is insufficient for a finding
that the Judds breached their duty to defend and warrant title; and
(2) Waterside waived their right to require Judds to defend title.
As discussed below, the Judds1 arguments are not supported by the
6

law or facts, and the decision of the trial court should be
affirmed.

POINT I:

A.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE JUDDS BREACHED
THEIR DUTY TO DEFEND AND WARRANT TITLE AND THE THAT
FINDING IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.

The Judds have Failed to Marshal the Evidence Which Supports
the Trial Court's Findings of Fact.

While the Judds claim that "the trial court's findings of
fact related to the Judds duty to defend title are not supported by
the record" (Appellants1 Brief at page 6), in reality, the Judds1
appeal is based upon their argument that there are facts in the
record which might support their theory of the case.

On appeal,

however, the standard of review for findings of fact does not
involve an analysis of whether the trial could have found for the
Judds. The focus is on whether the trial court's findings of fact
are supported by evidence in the record.

It is clear that a trial court's findings of fact will
not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Hoth v. White,
799 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788
P.2d 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As the Court of Appeals stated in
Hoth;

When challenging findings of fact on appeal, the
appellant must show that the factual findings are clearly
erroneous.
To show clear error, the appellant must
7

marshall all the evidence supporting the trial court's
factual findings and then demonstrate that the evidence,
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings.
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d at 216 (emphasis added).

Recently, this Court held:

An appellate court does not lightly disturb the verdict
of a jury nor the findings of fact made by a trial court.
If a challenge is made to the findings, an appellant must
marshal all the evidence in favor of the facts as found
by the trial court and then demonstrate that viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the court below,
the evidence is insufficient to support findings of fact.
Saunders v. Sharp, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Feb. 12, 1991).

While the Judds challenge the trial court's findings of
fact, they make no effort to support a reversal based on the
"clearly erroneous" standard which governs this appeal.

Rather

than marshall the evidence as this Court requires, the Judds simply
argue that there is testimony in the record which might support
their theory of the case.

In short, unhappy with the outcome

below, the Judds attempt to reargue the facts of their case in this
Court in hopes of a more favorable result.

Indeed, the Judds admit that there is evidence in the
record to support the trial court's findings of fact when they
state, "The only indication that the Judds may have failed to
defend title are contained in the allegations of the Third-Party
8

Complaint

(TR:00106) and the testimony proffered pursuant to

stipulation of the parties

(TR:00870, page 8, lines 17-19)."

(Appellants1 Brief at page 7). Of course, Waterside contends that
the record contains more evidence to support the findings of fact
than that referred to by the Judds (see Waterside's argument
below), but the fact remains that the section of the record cited
by the Judds does indeed support the trial court's findings of
fact.

The Judds' efforts fall short of carrying their burden of
proof to show that given the evidence as a whole the trial court
clearly erred. The Judds have not marshalled all the evidence.

B.

The Record Supports the Trial Court's Findings of Fact.

Even though the Judds failed to meet their burden of
proof and the appeal must be dismissed on that ground alone, it is
helpful to realize how strongly the record supports the trial
court's findings. The evidence is overwhelming.

1.

The Judds did no More than Appear at the Time of Trial
Boldly Announcing that They were Ready to Defeat the
Adverse Claim to Fee Simple Ownership.

The Judds argue that the record does not support the
trial court's findings that the Judds refused to defend title and
refused to participate in settlement negotiations.
9

There is,

however, ample evidence to support the trial court's findings.
This Court may overturn the trial court's findings only upon a
determination that the evidence "so clearly preponderates against
them that . . .

a manifest injustice has been done."

Hatch v.

Bastian. 567 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977).

Waterside proffered testimony that the Judds failed and
refused

"to accept the defense of the title, or to relieve

Waterside Associates, or Machan-Hampshire, or the joint venture of
any necessity of defending against the claims of [Cahoon], and that
indeed the response from the Judds was to bring a foreclosure
action which required Waterside Associates to obtain first a
temporary restraining order, and later a preliminary injunction to
avoid the foreclosure of the property."

(TR:00870, pages 8-9)

Waterside "received no real, or effective assistance from any
counsel hired by Doctor Judd with regard to defending against the
title claim." (TR:00870, page 10, lines 14-17)

Early on in the

litigation, Waterside had two meetings with counsel for the Judds
regarding settlement of Cahoonfs claims but nothing ever came of
them. (TR:00870, pages 10-11)

The
involvement

Judds1
in

proffer

defending

also

the

evidenced

title.

The

their
Judds

lack

of

had

no

communications from their attorney concerning "any discussions that
he held of a settlement nature or of assisting in defense of this
matter whatsoever." (TR:00870, page 21, lines 20-23)
10

The only evidence of anything done by the Judds, other
than appearing at trial, to defend title consists of the Judds
hiring three attorneys

(TR:00870, pages 16-18);

obtaining an

attorney's opinion in a letter dated November 15, 1986 (TR:00870,
page 17, lines 10-19), third-party defendants' Exhibit 39; and
requesting that substituted counsel examine the records of Cahoon.
(TR:00870, page 20, lines 16-18)
Judds

did

anything

else.

They

There is no evidence that the
did

not

even

fully

answer

Waterside's Third-Party Complaint against them. (TR: 00870, page 10,
lines 8-14)

The testimony and evidence of Waterside was that the
Judds did little more than appear at the time of trial, with
knowledge that Waterside had settled, and boldly announce that they
were ready to defeat Cahoon's claims to fee simple ownership. The
Judds failed to introduce evidence that they performed their duty
to defend title.

The trial court's finding is not "clearly

erroneous," but is supported by the evidence.

2.

The Trial Court's Finding that the Judds Breached their
Warranty of Title was Correct, Because Constructive
Eviction Under Paramount Title Constitutes a Breach of
the Covenant of Warranty of Title.

The Judds misstate the general rule of law concerning a
breach of covenant of warranty of title.

Breach of the covenant

occurs when it is shown that the grantor did not own the land that
he purported to convey by the warranty deed description.
11

Creason

L. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 403, 404 (1970).

However,

"it is not necessary to show an actual eviction or threat thereof."
Creason,

supra

(emphasis

added).

A grantee

is entitled to

compensation for the damage he suffers "as a result of the breach
[of warranty of title, including] taking measures as are reasonable
and necessary to clear up any difficulty which would represent a
substantial flaw in his title." Creason, supra. The Creason case
cited by the Judds in their brief is particularly enlightening on
this point.

In Creason, the grantee had purchased certain property by
warranty deed in which the meets and bounds description caused a
shift of the boundaries.

Upon discovering the apparent error in

the description, the grantee solicited adjoining property owners
for deeds to correct the error. The solicitation and correction of
the error cost the grantee at least $50 plus attorneys fees of
$720.

No one evicted the grantee, or even threatened eviction.

There was no determination by a court that an error existed or that
the grantor did not own the property he conveyed by warranty deed.
The court, however, noting the general rule of law stated that the
"[grantee] would be justified in doing whatever was reasonable and
prudent to clear [the defect]; and if this involved the necessity
of employing an attorney, the reasonable expense therefor would be
compensable."

Creason, 470 P.2d at 405-06 (citing Van Cott v.

Jacklin. 63 Utah 412, 226 P. 460 (1924)).

12

Waterside

discussed

the

fee

claims

of Cahoon with

Cahoon's counsel and, based upon a Supreme Court of Utah case
entitled State v^ Cox, 29 Utah 2d 127, 506 P.2d

54 (1973),

concluded that there were factual and legal questions which could
be found adverse to them, and if the court made those findings,
reversal on appeal was unlikely. (TR:00870, page 7, lines 1-10)
Waterside determined that it was prudent to settle the dispute with
Cahoon if reasonably possible without presenting the fee ownership
issue for judicial determination, (TR:00870, pages 5-7)
exactly what was done in Creason.

That is

The trial court's finding that

the Judds1 breached their warranty of title is supported by law and
should be affirmed.

POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE JUDDS OWED
WATERSIDE A DUTY TO DEFEND TITLE WHICH WATERSIDE DID NOT
WAIVE AND THE JUDDS FAILED TO PERFORM.

The Judds attempt to shift responsibility to Waterside
for their failure to defend by claiming that Waterside waived the
Judds1 duty to defend prior to trial by settling with Cahoon.
Appellants' Brief, pages 10-11.

Their contention is nonsensical

and unsupported by law.

Waterside faced an enormous loss in the event Cahoon were
granted fee title to the Property.

Waterside had developed the

Property prior to Cahoon's fee claims at a cost in excess of a
million dollars. (TR:00870, page 9, lines 16-17) An adverse ruling
13

would have been disastrous and irreparable.

Waterside took the

prudent and reasonable action in settling the fee claims of Cahoon.

The

Judds

contend

that

the

settlement

reached

by

Waterside with Cahoon precluded a hearing of the fee claim on its
merits, thereby preventing the Judds from consummating

their

defense of the title. The Judds were notified of the fee claim of
Cahoon and were invited to participate in settlement discussions.
The Judds refused.

At the outset of the litigation, Waterside made demand
upon the Judds to defend title and gave the Judds every opportunity
to participate and defend title to the Property. The Judds refused
the demands of Waterside and waited instead until trial to proclaim
their readiness to defend title.

Waterside did not at any time

waive the Judds1 duty to defend title to the Property, but called
on the Judds to fulfill their obligations under Utah Code Ann. §571-12

(1990).

Waterside was forced, by the Judds1 failure to

respond to their duty to defend, to take the only prudent action
and on the eve of trial, settle with Cahoon to avoid imminent and
irreparable harm.

Waterside did not waive the Judds1 duty to defend title
when it settled with Cahoon. An analogy can be made to the law of
insurance to illustrate the non-waiver of the Judds1 duty to defend
title, as well as the Judds1 breach of that duty and resulting
14

liability.

An insurer is bound to defend an insured against

lawsuits alleging facts and circumstances covered by the policy,
regardless of the merit of the allegations.

Carter v. Aetna

Casualty and Surety Co. . 473 F. 2d 1071, 1075 (8th Cir. 1973) . The
insurer's liability for refusing to defend may be for the full
amount of the insured's detriment, including the risk that the
insured will settle:

Once an insurer breaches its contract by refusing to
defend an action against its insured, it takes the risk
that the insured will have a judgment entered against
him, or will accept a settlement with the injured party.
The insurer is liable on its refusal to defend, and must
pay the amount of the judgment or settlement . . . .
Carter, 473 F.2d at 1078. If the insurer elects not to defend, it
does so at its peril.

Carter, supra.

By refusing to defend title to the Property, the Judds
breached their contract with Waterside contained in the Warranty
Deed and took the risk that Waterside would receive an adverse
judgment or settle with Cahoon.

The Judds became liable at the

time of their failure to defend for any judgment against Waterside
or any settlement entered into.

The settlement ultimately agreed

to by Waterside and Cahoon did not effect a waiver of the Judds1
duty to defend, which the Judds had already breached.

Instead, as

under similar circumstances governed by insurance law outlined
above, the Judds became liable to Waterside to the full extent of
the settlement together with defense costs.
15

See Carter, supra.

The trial court was correct in granting judgment in favor of
Waterside and against the Judds based on the evidence showing their
failure to defend title.

CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm the judgment of the trial court
in favor of Waterside.

There has been no showing that the trial

court clearly erred in its findings of fact or conclusions of law,
or that a manifest injustice has been done.

DATED this

J2*:
n^

day of August, 1991.

VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
Mark 0. Van Wagoner
McPHIE, CONDIE & PECK
Christopher J. Condie
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